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>> Disappointing’ is the word Tunisian actors most frequently useto describe the European response to the Tunisian revolution so
far. Drawing from extensive interviews with key Tunisian actors, this
brief examines the reasons for this disappointment. Not all is bleak;
some aspects of the European response have won appreciation from
Tunisians. But criticism exceeds appreciation of what the EU has done
so far. Not all Tunisian criticism of the EU may be entirely fair; a large
share is directed mainly at individual European states. But this report
offers pointers that policy-makers should heed, on where Tunisians
would like to see improvement in their relations with the Union.
The disappointment felt by many Tunisian actors is multi-layered.
Some sources of disenchantment are by now well known, but have yet
to subside. There was the early disappointment at the perceived
meagerness of initial aid efforts. In April, Tunisian Minister of Trade
and Tourism Mehdi Houas expressed his dismay at the ‘17 petits
millions d’euros’ of EU assistance, referring to the initial EU package
announced in February to aid the democratic transition. There is a
resurgent indignation that Europe did so little to help promote human
rights and democracy during the long Ben Ali years. Much ire is still
directed against France for its multiple missteps in Tunisia. Then
Foreign Minister Michèle Alliot Marie’s by now infamous actions were
not isolated events. The French government’s authorisation of the sale
of tear gas to Tunisia as the uprising was gaining momentum, the
Minister of Culture and Communication Frédéric Mitterrand’s defense
of the Ben Ali regime and the actions of a number of other French
personalities, including the new French ambassador in Tunis, have
ensured a steady stream of additional axes to grind. Italy’s single-
minded preoccupation with migration is also criticised.
• Tunisians are disappointed
with European responses to
the revolution.
• Tunisian expectations of
Europe are focused less on
assistance in building
democratic institutions, and
more on changing the Euro-
Tunisian relationship as a
whole.
• Tunisians would welcome
swifter action on the return
of looted funds, a clearer
future vision for EU-Tunisian
relations, and mobility; a
more muted tone in the
debate on illegal migration
is also desired.
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Beyond such issues, there is the disappointment
growing out of what could be called a décalage, or
discrepancy, between Tunisian expectations and
European commitments. At the basis of this
décalage is the fact that Tunisian demands for
support for its democratic revolution do not focus
primarily on assistance in building democratic
institutions. While expecting such assistance, many
Tunisians fear that it may also amount to
interference. Tunisian expectations are instead
centered on the relationship between Europe and
Tunisia as a whole. In a sense, Tunisians are hoping
to revolutionise their external relations as well as
their internal politics. Tunisians feel they should
now be treated according to the values of the club
of Western democracies. At this level, European
countries—if not always the EU as such—has so
far disappointed badly. Criticism focuses on the
funds looted by Ben Ali and stashed away in
European banks; European  failure to engage with
civil society  demands regarding debt relief; the lack
of a clear vision for future relations; and the
treatment of Tunisian migrants and visitors to
Europe.
THE POSITIVE ASPECTS
Tunisians that have come into direct contact
with European initiatives since the revolution
are generally positive. ‘I was at the European
Parliament and I understood then that the
Europeans have realised that they have made an
error of judgment as regards us Tunisians’, says
Messaoud Romdhani, a member of the Haute
instance pour la réalisation des objectifs de la
révolution, de la réforme politique et de la
transition démocratique. The organisations and
political parties that have received visits and
benefited from exchanges with representatives of
European governments and NGOs are also
generally welcoming, at least as concerns the
principle of support: ‘The open dialogue
between civil society, political parties and the
Europeans is positive and interesting and it helps
build confidence’, says Ajmi Lourimi, a member
of Ennadha’s Executive Committee. Here also,
there are voices of deception, however: ‘Look at
the refugee camps on our borders and compare
to the foreign-sponsored seminars in 5-star
hotels—why such a waste of resources?’ wonders
blogger Fatma Riahi. There is also generally a
wariness of outside interference in the
democratisation process.
The new interest that the revolution has
generated in European states such as Germany,
Poland and the Scandinavian countries is
generally viewed as positive. ‘We are interested
in new friendships in addition to the traditional
ones’, PDP party representative Ahmed Bouazzi
underlines. Also, several interviewees stressed
that they were positively surprised by the
Spanish response, which they see as rapid and
supportive: Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez
Zapatero was an early visitor in Tunis.
Although there has been disappointment
regarding the levels of financial assistance, such
sentiments may well recede if offers of financial
assistance translate into concrete and swift
action on the ground. Levels of assistance similar
to those offered to Central and Eastern Europe
after the fall of communism, as hoped for by
Réalités journalist Azza Turki, are not (yet) on
the table. But within the last few weeks, the
substantial G8 offers of assistance coupled with
additional pledges of bilateral assistance were
greeted with satisfaction in Tunisia. As stressed
by European diplomats interviewed for this
study, the ball will then be in the camp of the
Tunisian government, which has to show that it
has credible and sustainable plans for spending
the funds. The Tunisian government, one
diplomat stressed, will also have to stop playing
one donor against another, going for ‘easy’
French and Italian money offered without any
strings attached.
THE DISCREPANCIES
The return of looted funds has been one of the
main issues brought to the fore by Tunisian civil
society since the revolution: it has been the focus
of demonstrations, online debate and is a
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recurrent topic in the mainstream media. It is
seen by many Tunisian actors as a moral
imperative, not least since the money is a potent
symbol of the close links between the Ben Ali
regime and European countries, and of the fact
that European businesses gained from Ben Ali’s
rule. The restitution of the Ben Ali-Trabelsi
funds is also seen as an issue of justice and a test
case for the rule of law.
There is increasing recognition within Tunisia
that part of the blame for the lack of advancement
on this dossier must be put on the Tunisian
interim government. As noted by a European
diplomatic source in
Tunis, the Tunisian
government has es-
tablished a very
narrow list of only
43 persons suspected
of embezzlement. It
omits many well-
known criminal
operators, including
union and business
bosses known for
their corruption. 
If the dossier has
received much attention in Tunisia, it seems to
have a low profile within the EU. Switzerland is
to date the only country publicly to have stated
the full amount of money frozen in its banks,
CHF 60 million (EUR 46 million). A European
diplomat confirmed that EU civil servants
working on Tunisia do not have information
regarding the assets of Tunisian origin currently
frozen in individual member states. There is also
no review process foreseen for the Council
decision regarding the freezing. 
Debt relief is a second main issue brought up by
civil society actors, including the UGTT trade
union, the Tunisian Bar Association and various
NGOs. It also garners support within the
reformist branch of the main business
organization UTICA. Debt relief is not
uncontroversial, however, and a number of
Tunisian economists and political party
representatives point out that Tunisia’s debt
levels are manageable and that debt relief may
make future borrowing more difficult and costly.
‘While the symbolic gesture would be nice, we
are capable of reimbursing our debt,’ PDP
Executive Committee member Bouazzi stresses –
a view shared by Ennadha party representatives.
Again, on the EU side, this has so far been a no-
go. ‘This is a false issue’, EU representative Dirk
Buda stated, ‘debt levels are below the EU
average’. EU officials insist that technically the
Union cannot get into the issue of debt relief
unless there is IMF involvement and an IMF-
EU agreement on additional needs, which is
currently not the case. 
Tunisian actors stress the urgent need for a clear
European vision for the future, beyond the
advanced status that could serve as an anchor for
the revolution. ‘We have made a revolution in
record time… that merits a little more drive [on
the part of the EU]’, one minister stressed in an
interview with a French newspaper. Many other
Tunisian actors agree, slamming European
‘attentisme’. There is a consensus that an
advanced status does not constitute an adequate
vision, not least since it has already been granted
to non-democratic states such as Morocco and
Jordan. There is no agreement on the exact
status sought, however. Some mention a status
similar to that of Switzerland and Norway,
others the status currently enjoyed by Israel.
Migration and mobility is a widely reported
source of disunity. To many Tunisian actors, the
main message to have come out of Europe since
the revolution is not European expressions of
support and admiration or promises of substantial
financial assistance, but the treatment of the
20,000 Tunisians landing on Lampedusa in the
early spring. ‘It hurts’ and ‘Please stop making
such a big affair out of this’, are recurrent
comments. ‘A minimum of respect would have
been expected. The Tunisian migrants were not
even properly fed and the authorities did not let
humanitarian organisations or Tunisians already >>>>>>
Tunisians are 
hoping to
revolutionise 
their external
relations as 
well as their 
internal politics
there come to the rescue. This is shocking coming
from our traditional European partners’ is a
statement (made by four representatives of the
Committee Sauvons l’UTICA) that well sums up
the general sentiment.
Although European officials stress the important
difference in legal status between the mainly
economic migrants leaving Tunisia and the
refugees fleeing war-ravaged Libya (and in
general warmly welcomed into Tunisia),
Tunisian actors regularly compare the two.
Thus, for example, interim Prime Minister Beji
Caid Essebsi said in an interview with a French
magazine: ‘Do you realize, 160,000 immigrants
suddenly coming to us is… the equivalent of
one million immigrants going to France in a few
days. I don’t even dare imagine the panic. I am
not giving anyone any lessons, but I believe that
democracy means precisely this: to solve
smoothly problems that appear naturally in a
society.’
At a more general level, increased mobility is
undoubtedly the main demand on the Tunisian
side at present. It is both an important issue of
principle and a very practical concern for most
Tunisians: ‘The politics of closed borders is
inadmissible in the 21st century”, Nadia
Hakimi, Executive Director of the Association
Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates stressed.
Reformist UTICA members underlined the
pragmatic side: ‘The visa regime and the
circulation of businessmen in Europe must be
facilitated. Similarly, we need a migratory
strategy for young people with diplomas to
decrease the pressure of unemployment within
Tunisia.’
Many within the European Commission seem to
understand these demands. The Commission’s
Partnership for Democracy and Shared
Prosperity includes some tentative elements on
mobility, and the recent New Response to a
Changing Neighbourhood document proposes a
Mobility Partnership with Tunisia. It also calls
on member states to make full use of flexible
visas as offered by the EU Visa Code.
However, it is unclear whether the Commission
can get key EU countries, including France and
Italy, on its side. The omens are not good, given
that the temporary acceptance by Italy of the
20,000 Tunisians from Lampedusa has led to
such considerable intra-EU tensions, with the
French re-imposing border controls to prevent
the Tunisians from crossing into France. As
confirmed by a European diplomat, dealing with
the mobility issue is ‘very difficult because of the
rise of the extreme right in many quarters in
Europe and the presidential elections in France
coming up.’
Less discussed have been the discrepancies over
social activism. Put crudely, there is a stark
difference between a Tunisian public which is in
many ways in its finest hour, discussing
democratic principles, solidarity with the
displaced, how to lift Tunisians from the interior
out of poverty, how to ensure a better future for
their children and grandchildren, etc. with a
European public that is often described as fearful
of the future and lacking a clear projet de société. 
Some Tunisians also express a certain
disappointment with European civil society and
the European public. ‘Civil society in Europe
should express its solidarity with Tunisia’ the
head of the Centre for Mediterranean and
International Studies Ahmed Driss stresses,
‘Currently, it is only politicians that talk’. Others
take a similar view: ‘European civil society
organisations are with us, but they have not had
the success that we have had in changing
realities. Now, it is up to them to be equally
efficient!’ says a member of the Haute instance.
There is a sense that expressions of regret for
past European actions vis-à-vis Tunisia have
been slow to materialise: ‘There is no humility.
The vision is one of mistrust and arrogance.
Europe would need to go through a profound
introspection’, says Omar Mestiri, director of
Radio Kalima, a long-standing opposition radio
station.
That principles are at the forefront in the
current Tunisian debate is also reflected in
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demands for a redefined relationship: ‘we hope
for a change in attitudes, a relation of friendship,
based on mutual respect and equality. This is our
dream, a dream of another relationship’. Many
Tunisians stress the importance of Europe
considering EU-Tunisian relations as win-win
and mutually beneficial, rather tainted by
security concerns and depicting Arabs as ‘the
Others’. 
There have been, on the European side,
expressions of regret and hopes for a new
beginning, perhaps most eloquently expressed
by Commissioner for Enlargement and
European Neighbourhood Policy Štefan Füle. It
seems, however, that these have been swamped
by a second line of more narrowly self-interested
European discourse. 
Another challenge for a Europe struggling with
issues of identity and multiculturalism is the
long-standing dual Tunisian identity (in some
respects not unlike that of Turkey). ‘Tunisia has
two doors, one leading towards Europe and the
other towards the Arab world. Both sources of
identity are equally important to Tunisians.
Europe, by contrast, has limited understanding
and knowledge of Tunisia’ according to one civil
society representative. Statements such as these
are confirmed in a recent opinion poll, which
found that approximately 55 per cent of Tuni -
sians thought that Tunisian society today is close
to the Western model while 45 per cent found it
closer to the Arab-Muslim model.
WHAT TUNISIANS WANT FROM
EUROPE
For Tunisians, mobility is a key issue both for
economic reasons and because there cannot be
any sense, on either side, of a shared destiny as
long as it is very difficult for many Tunisians
even to pay a visit to Europe. This is of course a
politically difficult issue in a Europe where
xenophobia seems to be gaining ground in some
quarters. A clearer European rejection of
intolerable statements—such as those made
recently by an Italian minister suggesting the use
of arms against migrants—would also help
achieve greater European moral clarity on
migration.
To anchor the democratic development, many
Tunisians find it important that the EU
establishes a single, clear offer of future status,
with gradual steps along the way to achieving
that status. As things now stand, there are
multiple proposed partnerships in various issue
areas and a global vision is lacking for what the
Euro-Mediterranean space will look like ten
years from now.
The Ben Ali/Trabelsi money stashed in
European banks is an important moral and
symbolic issue in Tunisia. In light of this, and in
line with commitments made at the recent G8
summit, it would be important for each EU
country to state how much money and other
assets have been frozen in view of possible
repatriation to Tunisia and also which banks
have been holding embezzled funds—not least
since those banks have clearly failed to make
mandatory due diligence checks. The EU must
communicate more openly on the steps that
European and Tunisian authorities will have to
take to ensure repatriation, and the time that
this is expected to take.
If debt annulment or rescheduling is—as seems
to be the case—a no-go, a more open dialogue
with Tunisian civil society actors on the issue
might help dispel misunderstandings. If Europe
is truly to support civil society in the country, it
will have to be ready to engage with it, including
on demands which are not those which Europe
expects or finds the most constructive.
The old interests and networks spanning the two
sides of the Mediterranean are not yet broken.
Ms. Allliot-Marie is most certainly not the only
pro-Ben Ali European personality to believe that
she did ‘nothing wrong’ in Tunisia. European
countries must make sure that old networks 
are superseded by new links and relationships.
This requires, amongst other things, that EU
5
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countries beyond Tunisia’s traditional partners
take a long-term, sustained interest in the
country. It also requires full application of
national, European and international anti-
corruption legislation vis-à-vis European
businesses operating in Tunisia.
European civil society organisations have been
put to the test by the successes of civil society in
Tunisia. Some Tunisian observers stress that
European associations will need to show not
only that they can work effectively with Tunisian
partners during the transition, but more
importantly that they can energize people within
Europe so as to reinforce solidarity between the
north and the south of the Mediterranean. 
It would be unfair to expect a quickly and
perfectly formed European response to the
sudden and unexpected revolution in Tunisia.
Working in Tunisia is also not without its
difficulties. For example, Tunisians will have to
discuss openly and be clearer about what
distinguishes welcome help from undue
interference. Navigating the line between much-
demanded support and derided ingérence is
currently tricky for international actors. At the
same time, the revolution has, yet again, made
the perennial question regarding European
leadership painfully clear: who speaks for
Europe? Is it a visionary such as Štefan Füle? Is it
Angela Merkel, who was very supportive of
Tunisia in the early hours of the revolution? Or
is it Silvio Berlusconi and his ministers?
Tunisians simply don’t know. In sum, with a
historic opportunity offered by the Tunisian
revolution, it is not yet clear that Europe is
indeed rising to the occasion.
Anna Khakee is an associate researcher at FRIDE.
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